WGBH Nuclear Age 13 Feb 1989

(Fear of Sovs led to nuclears in Germany ... [?]

wanted nucs + early use of nucs

For France, nucs as a substitute for empire

Humiliation of France in DBP → (Mendès-France!) nucs

of France in Suez, especially (ready for de Gaulle)

(national deterrent

of Macmillan over Skybolt → Polaris

AF (Col.) John Richardson: He found NATO was finished — couldn't raise the 90 divs. (he thought necessary, not 12) — unless American technology could come up ... [illegible] means & manpower

"Sovs had to go back and take 10 or 20 years to figure out how to cope with this new technology — we bought 10-20 yrs of deterrence.

(Britain; China, etc. would have gotten them anyway.

(maybe — but

Russian fear of German army was real

→ Warsaw Pact

[MRBMs / IRBMs! vs. Bomber / Missile Gap

Min det vs. US, Max Det for Germans!

2

Adenauer pushed for conventional defense!
thought Germany contribution would make
nucs unnecessary
But Hungary 1956 ruthlessness changed this
mind — made nucs look necessary. Strauss
made Def Min — anti-Com, convert to US strategy

"War should be looked on to be as terrible as
we can imagine it — then we will have a
more peaceful 100 years than the last.

But why on German soil? Rely on SAC.

But in 1957, Sputnik.
A month after Sputnik II (dog) Ike arrived to reassure NATO.

FU threat (But why two nucs, under US control, more deterrent?
Cuba II shows why — in K mind, and in McN mind)

1. US warheads to be stockpiled on Continent;
In time of war, US Pres would "release" warheads to
European vehicles...

Chevron

In 1960, US had 6000 warheads, Sov had a few hundred
(ratio worse in '50's). But two were parity to be exploited!

3

"Joe was had seemed a good idea when the enemy couldn't fire back."

But they continued to be procured
(and deployed, by McN!)

(Planning is childish at each point, for each country;
look

McN "There is an unacceptable risk of nuclear war today —
(because of early use of nuclears in Europe)
— That is a disgraceful state of affairs"

[McG: a plan to attack is not a Pres decision or intent;

BUT — a Pres intent or an decision not to execute plan (or generate + execute new ones) does not assure 1) it will not get executed
2) he will not change his mind, execute!
(see VN!

This situation is better than the reverse, which Pres pretends is the case; but Vonnegut "You are what you pretend to be" — e.g. someone capable of FU, capable of invasion, capable of preemption

13 Feb 89

4

Crisis Path

I Leaders threaten other leaders with humiliation,
and inflict it, often without intending it,
often ~~without~~ without caring,
often intending it — but with little thought
of consequences:

A (crisis
surprise feelings))
panic
desperation
shame
rage
desire for revenge
vindication

B
~~Secrecy~~
Surprising
Violent
Military
Covert
Illegal
Immoral
Terrorist
Reckless
Uncalculating

crisis
A feelings
in others
(opponents,
but perhaps
allies, who
relied on
assurances,
other restraints

repair of status, prestige, self-esteem

proceeding to do so by choosing "solutions" that are violent, reckless, illegal, ~~&~~ — and surprising and humiliating to others (crises).

Ea crisis involves threats and exchanges of
surprising humiliations — often unforeseen by both
potential loss/defeat is potential humiliation
→ (fear of physical damage — slight — is not key! even in CII)

OTHER "FEARS" OVERRIDE PHYSICAL CAUTION & MORALITY often

Iranians take Embassy — surprise for US (?) Humil.!
like fall of Shah (major intell failure)
(worst since Pearl Harbor
because of blind support of Shah;
and (?) Carter policies on CIA
Carter "Intell activities of intell com. will be
legal and proper."

Cuba II is perfect example of K/T:

To avoid sure S-r humiliation, leader takes

chance [illegible] of catastrophe

K thinks loss of Cuba is sure in 1962; Desert One disaster

sends missiles (secretly) — error, though

"prudent" awareness of

blockade; not absurd; could have

succeeded (not likely to keep secrets,)

but JFK might have kept secret (?)

JFK sees sure S-r loss of position, US status,

elections (maybe Berlin)

gambles to avoid loss

(see 1965)

on Senate Intelligence 13 Feb 89

Arthur Liman —

The oversight committees are afraid to know — because if you know, you have to act.